Abstract : An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. The users and eavesdropper available information rates are consistent with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
Introduction
In the continuous variables quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol introduced in ref. [1] , Alice sends Bob a train of coherent states ip x + where the quadratures ( ) p x, are randomly chosen from a bivariate Gaussian distribution with variance A V . Bob randomly measures either x or p , and publicly announces his choice. A binary secret key is then extracted from the correlated continuous data by using a sliced reconciliation algorithm [2, 3] .
The action of a possible eavesdropper appears as added noise on the observed continuous data. More precisely, line losses correspond to a restricted class of attacks, called beam-splitting attacks, which only add Gaussian ``vacuum" noise. Other attacks typically add more noise, called ``excess noise", which may be non-Gaussian. It is crucial to evaluate these noises with the required accuracy in order to ensure the security of CV-QKD.
We have explicitly implemented several non-trivial actions of the eavesdropper Eve. These attacks are implemented optically as partial intercept-resend (IR) operations, in which a fraction m of the signal beam is measured and subsequently re-prepared, and a fraction m -1 is eavesdropped using a beam splitter (BS). These attacks enable Eve to control independently the two main channel parameters (i.e. transmission and noise), simply by adjusting the intercepted fraction : the BS part controls the loss corresponding to the channel transmission T and the IR part controls the excess noise e referred to the shot noise level (denoted 0 N ). The probability distribution of Bob's measurements becomes the weighted sum of two Gaussian distributions with different variances, namely 0 N TV A + for the transmitted data (BS) and 0 2N TV A + for the resent data (IR), so the attack is no more Gaussian. We have realized the IR attack using the device described on figure 1. It is a coherent-state QKD setup, working at 1550 nm and exclusively assembled with fiber optics and fast telecom components [4] . It displaces a train of pulsed coherent states within the complex plane, with arbitrary amplitude and phase, randomly chosen from a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution with variances rate is 500 kHz. The signal is sent to Bob along with a strong phase reference, or local oscillator (LO), with 9 10 photons per pulse. Bob selects an arbitrary measurement phase with a phase modulator placed on the LO path. The selected quadrature is measured with an all-fiber shot noise limited, time-resolved homodyne detector.
Experimental setup
To avoid unnecessary hardware duplication, the IR attack has been split in three phases, with the role of Eve being played either by Alice or by Bob. First, Alice sends coherent states, and Bob simulates Eve measuring the x quadrature of the incoming states. Then, the same operation is repeated with a p measurement. To take into account Eve's beam splitter, the variance measured by Eve (actually Bob) is adjusted to be exactly half of Alice's output modulation. Both x and p measurement outputs are then communicated to Alice through a classical channel so that she can simulate Eve resending coherent states that are displaced accordingly. After this sequence, the correlations between Alice and Bob are measured in order to determine the channel parameters.
Experimental results.
Knowing those experimental parameters, one can deduce the mutual informations between Alice and Bob and between Bob and Eve and the subsequent secret bit rate. I is plotted for a Gaussian model with equivalent excess noise (solid lines), as well as for a BS attack (dotted lines), and for a partial IR attack (dashed lines). It is compared with the Gaussian mutual information AB I . As expected, the IR attack enables to exploit the excess noise, giving Eve extra information above the BS attack. We show statistical fluctuations (±1 standard deviation) corresponding to a data subset of 5000 points per block.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have implemented partial intercept-resend attacks, which allows Eve to exploit the excess noise and are thus more general than simple ``beam-splitting attacks'' as considered so far. Our experiment confirms that such attacks can be successfully detected and eliminated by accurately monitoring the variances of all (``vacuum'' and ``excess'') noises of the channel. It is also particularly important in view of the recent proof [5, 6] that the optimal collective attack for a given noise variance is Gaussian, thus showing that the security of our Gaussian-modulated protocol remains warranted under very general conditions.
